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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW- PROSECUTOR, CALLING A WITNESS
TO THE STAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXACTING
A CLAIM OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIM-
INATION IS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR. Namet v. United
States (United States Supreme Court 1963).
Namet and Mr. and Mrs. Kahn were charged with violation of a
federal wagering tax law.' Prior to the trial the Kahns pleaded
guilty. Namer persisted in his innocence and was brought to trial.
The prosecutor called Mrs. Kahn as a witness. She refused to testify,
asserting her privilege against self-incrimination. The court ruled
that since she had pleaded guilty she must answer questions concern-
ing her own gambling activities, but as to third persons her privilege
still existed.2 After this ruling the prosecutor made no attempt to
connect Mrs. Kahn with Namer. Later the prosecutor called Mr.
Kahn. After a series of questions concerning his gambling activi-
ties, four questions were asked. His refusal to answer these questions
was sustained. Each question was designed to connect Mr. Kahn with
Namet.3 The jury was charged relative to these two incidents:
"Nor should any inference be drawn against him (Namer) because
of the Kahns (sic) refusal to testify, unless it would be a logical in-
ference that would appeal to you as having a direct bearing upon
the defendant's guilt."4 (Emphasis added.)
No objection was made to this charge. Namer was found guilty.
He moved for a new trial on the ground of prejudicial misconduct on
the part of the prosecutor in asking questions which he knew the wit-
ness would refuse to answer. This motion was denied. Namer's con-
viction was upheld by the First Circuit.5
The Supreme Court affirmed. Since much of the Kahns' testi-
mony was non-privileged and material, the prosecutor committed no
1 26 U.S.C. § 4411 (1958). "IMPOSITION OF TAX. There shall be imposed
a special tax of $50 per year to be paid by each person who is liable for
tax under section 4401 or who is engaged in receiving wagers for or on be-
half of any person so liable."
2 The court eventually concluded that Mrs. Kahn's plea of guilty to the charge
of engaging in the business of accepting wagers deprived her of the right to
refuse to testify about her own gambling activity. But the court also ruled
that she did not have to testify about dealings with third persons since
she was still, at least theoretically, subject to prosecution for conspiracy, or
possible bribery. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, affirming 301
F. 2d 314 (1st Cir. 1963).
8 Id. at 184, n.3. The questions were:
"Can you tell us what those dealings (with others) were?"
"And were you paid a commission on all bets you took in your variety
store?"
"Who did you accept bets from that you took in your variet store?"
"Did you ever take bets from the defendant, David Namet?'
- 373 U.S. at 185.
5 301 F. 2d 314 (1st Cir. 1963).
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error by putting them on the stand. The asking of the questions
assigned as error was nothing more than a minor lapse during a long
trial. The majority of the court also reasoned that since the impro-
priety of the instruction had not been preserved on appeal,' the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant had not been affected so as to de-
mand reversal under Rule 52 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.'
The dissent argued that the prosecution obviously knew the
questions were privileged and would not have asked them unless
they would have helped the government's case. This, coupled with
the instruction which allowed the jury to infer as much as its fancy
dictated, was simply an unfair way for the government to obtain
convictions. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 (1963).
Namet distinguished prior federal decisions on their facts. It
did not overrule them. The Supreme Court granted certiorari for
an asserted conflict in the circuits.' There was, however, no con-
flict among the circuits in principle. Prior federal decisions had in-
dicated that four elements must be present before reversal could be
granted: (1) asking the privileged question,1" (2) bad faith by
the prosecutor, 1 (3) absence of a curative instruction," and (4)
aggravated circumstances. 3
United States v. Maloney'4 is the only reported Federal decision
holding that it is reversible error for the prosecutor to call a wit-
ness, knowing that the witness will, because of his complicity with
the defendant, refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrimination.
Maloney involved a blackmail indictment with five co-defend-
ants.'" One of the five, having already pleaded guilty, was called
as a witness for the prosecution. His testimony was subject to serious
impeachment. because of his past criminal record and because he was
an accomplice seeking leniency. Considering these factors it was un-
6 FED. R. Crmn. P. 30, "No party may assign as error any portion of the
charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires
to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection
out of the hearing of th
7 FED. R. CRim. P. 52 (b).'Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting sub-
stantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court.
8 373 U.S. at 187.
9 Id. at 180.
10 United States v. Tucker, 267 F. 2d 212 (3d Cir. 1959).
11 United States v. Cioffl, 242 F. 2d 473 (2d Cir. 1957).
12 Weinbaum v. United States, 184 F. 2d 330 (9th Cir. 1950); United States
v. Amadio, 215 F. 2d 605 (7th Cir. 1954).
13 United States v. Hiss, 185 F. 2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950).
'4 262 F. 2d 535 (2d Cir. 1959).
16 There were five counts in the indictment: Conspiracy to commit blackmail;
abeting Maloney in false pretenses; demanding money; obtaining money; the
fifth was dismissed by the court.
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likely that the jury would believe his testimony without corrobora-
tion. To accomplish corroboration, the prosecutor called three other
witnesses. All the questions asked of these witnesses were directed
at connecting Maloney with the crime. In each instance, after being
prompted by the defense, the witness refused to testify. The court
sustained their refusal. In his summation to the jury, the prosecu-
tor, conceding that he knew or anticipated that two of the wit-
nesses would refuse to testify, then proceeded to draw adverse in-
ferences from their refusals. The defense did not request a cura-
tive instruction and none was given. The Court of Appeal stated that
the failure to give a curative instruction sua sponte was funda-
mental error within the purview of rule 5 2 (b) .'
Maloney was the bulwark of Namet's appeal. However, it was
distinguished on its facts. The court ultimately held that the errors
in Namet were not sufficiently prejudicial nor was the record so
conclusive as to bad faith as to warrant a reversal.
A survey of state and federal decisions indicates that bad faith
exists when the prosecutor knowing that a witness will refuse to tes-
tify calls the witness so that the jury may draw an unfavorable in-
ference towards the defendant because of the witness' refusal to
testify. 7 Bad faith has been found, in prior decisions, to exist in
cases involving the following factual situations. (1) In pretrial in-
terrogation the witness refused to answer on the ground of self-
incrimination and the prosecutor called the witness during the trial."8
(2) Where there has been a mistrial or a reversal and a new
trial ordered and in the first trial the witness refused to testify on
the ground of self-incrimination and the prosecutor called the
witness to the stand in the second trial. 9 (3) Where counsel for
the witness or, for that matter, for the defendant states that the wit-
ness will refuse to testify, bad faith may be shown."' (4) Where
the prosecutor stages the incident. This may result when everything
indicates that the witness will refuse to testify but the prosecutor
calls him for its effect.2'
Where the prosecutor in bad faith calls the witness, defense coun-
sel should make a seasonable objection to preserve the question on
appeal.2" No error can be predicated on such an incident where the
16 FED. R. CraM. P. 52 (b).
'7 Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 1443 (1961).28 The point is discussed in People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P. 2d
794 (1940).19 United States v. Tucker, 267 F. 2d at 215.
20 Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 488, 299 S.W. 2d 706 (1956); Johnson
v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 6, 252 S.W. 2d 462 (1952).
21 Washburn v. State, supra note 20; DeGesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426,
364 P. 2d 374 (1961).
22 United States v. 5 Cases, 179 F. 2d 519 (2d Cir. 1950).
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questions relate to the offense to which the witness has pleaded guilty
or has been convicted. 3
The state courts which have considered the question raised in
Namet, in contrast with federal decisions, are in discord.2" General-
ly three positions are taken: (1) Error which is sufficiently prej-
udicial and aggravated is a ground for reversal even though a cura-
tive instruction is given.25 (2) Reversible error is cured" if the
jury is instructed to disregard the witness' refusal to testify. 7 This
is the majority view and the position taken by the federal courts.2"
(3) The defendant cannot be prejudiced, on the theory that im-
munity is a personal privilege, and although the witness cannot be
compelled to answer he must exercise his claim on the stand. 9
Texas held, in Washburn v. State,3" that there was prejudicial
error where protracted questioning of a witness (twenty-two pages
of the printed record) ensued after a refusal to testify had been sus-
tained. The appellate court held that a curative instruction did not
purge the effect of such conduct upon the jury. This case appears to
be singular in its holding, i.e., a curative instruction not purging the
error.
Two California decisions have considered whether these situa-
tions are prejudicial error: People v. Plyler (1889)31 and People
v. Kynette (1940)." In Plyler the prosecutor called as a witness
a confederate under indictment for the same offense. The witness
refused to testify on the ground of self-incrimination. In holding
that no error was committed, the Supreme Court of California
stated:
It is urged that this was error, tending to prejudice defendant's case
before the jury. Either the district attorney was of exceptionally
sanguine temperament or his hope of eliciting any valuable testi-
mony from a witness situated as was Schoedde must have been
extremely slight. Still, error cannot be predicated upon futile effort,
23 United States v. Gernie, 252 F. 2d 664 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v.
Romero, 249 F. 2d 371 (2d Cir. 1957).
24 Only five states have reported decisions considering the question: California,
Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Texas.
25 Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 488, 299 S.W. 2d 706.
26 See Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 1443 (1961). A curative instruction is one which
charges the jury that they must disregard the refusal of the witness to testify
and that no inference one way or the other may be drawn towards the de-
fendant because of the refusal.
27 People v. Kynette, 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P. 2d 794 (1940); DeGesualdo v.
People, 147 Colo. 426, 364 P. 2d 374 (1961); Commonwealth v. Granito,
326 Mass. 494, 95 N.E. 2d 539 (1950).
28 262 F. 2d 535.
29 State v. Snyder, 244 Iowa 1244, 59 N.W. 2d 223 (1953).
30 164 Tex. Crim. 53, 251 S.W. 1099 (1923).
31 121 Cal. 160, 53 Pac. 553 (1898).
32 15 Cal. 2d 731, 104 P. 2d 794 (1940).
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even though it was followed by all the injurious effects which de-
fendant portrays; for Schoedde still was a competent witness for
the prosecution, and could refuse to testify only by exercise of the
privilege of which he availed himself 3
Whether the prosecutor knew the witness would not testify and
called him solely for the effect upon the jury is not clear from the
record. However, the language of the court indicates that such knowl-
edge and conduct on the part of the prosecutor would not be a suf-
ficient basis upon which to predicate error.
In Kynette three police officers who were called as witnesses
had, prior to the trial, asserted their respective privileges against
self-incrimination, once in the prosecutor's office and once before
the grand jury. Kynette was charged with attempted murder. There
was some indication that the three witnesses had participated in
wire-tapping, a crime under the California Penal Code. 4 Each wit-
ness refused to testify when called to the stand by the prosecutor.
The opinion does not clearly indicate whether the calling of these
witnesses under the circumstances constituted harmless error or no
error at all. The California Supreme Court found that the prosecu-
tor's questioning of these witnesses was not prejudicial. The fact that
these witnesses previous to the trial had asserted extrajudicially their
constitutional right to refuse to answer did not preclude the prose-
cution from calling them during the trial and interrogating them
under oath, upon the subject of wire-tapping, in the hope that in
the interim they might have undergone a change of mind and be
willing to disclose such information.35 The opinion did observe that
the trial court had instructed the jury, when the first police officer
was called, that no inference was to be drawn from his refusal to
testify. From this it appears that Kynette recognizes error could be
committed where the prosecutor stages such an incident. The court
in Kynette did not mention People v. Plyler. Plyler, it will be re-
called, held no error can be committed under any circumstance.
In DeGesualdo v. People (1961)," the Colorado Supreme Court
rejected the reasoning of Plyler and followed Washburn. Thus, it
was held, where the jury knew that the witness was under indict-
ment for the same offense and the witness exercised his privilege
against self-incrimination and no instruction was given to disregard
the witness' refusal, reversible error had been committed. It is sig-
nificant that in DeGesualdo only three questions were asked of the
witness.
3 53 Pac. at 554.
s4 CAL. ANN. PEN. CoDE § 640.
35 Kynette, 104 P. 2d at 802.
s3 147 Colo. 426, 364 P. 2d 374 (1961).
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Applying the test laid down by the earlier federal cases, Namet
is a poor decision. Under this test there must be:
1. The asking of the privileged questions;
2. Bad faith on the part of the prosecutor;
3. An absence of a curative instruction; and
4. The questions must be sufficiently aggravated and prejudicial
so as to demand reversal.
In Namet the trial court ruled that the Kahns' privilege against
self-incrimination did exist since they were still punishable for con-
spiracy. The prosecutor interrogated Mr. Kahn in the face of the
court's ruling that Mr. Kahn did not have to answer questions relat-
ing to third persons. Thus, the prosecutor had reason to believe Mr.
Kahn would refuse to answer such questions. It is reasonable to infer
that the questions were propounded so that the jury could draw an
unfavorable inference towards the defendant. The majority in Namet
refused to decide the issue of the impropriety of the instruction by
holding the question was not preserved on appeal.
It is generally conceded that no inference should be drawn from
the defendant's refusal to testify." No inference for or against the
defendant should be drawn when a witness exercises his privilege
under the Fifth Amendment.3" The defendant cannot control the
testimony of the witness. It is, of course, possible that the testimony,
if given, would be favorable to the defendant. And yet the court in
Namet instructed: "Nor should any inference be drawn against
him because the Kahns (sic.) refused to testify, unless it would be
a logical inference that would appeal to you as having a direct bear-
ing upon the defendant's guilt." (Emphasis added.) No objection
was made and it was not assigned as error on appeal. The majority
of the Court reasoned that the error had been waived.
Namet implied that four questions were not prejudicial. It was
silent as to whether any particular number of questions were needed
as a prerequisite for reversal. The majority cites United States v.
Hiss9 and characterizes the asking of the questions as a minor
lapse during a long trial.
A survey of the cases indicates the test to be: Did the questions
prejudicially affect the jury in the light of all the circumstances of
the case?4" No particular number of questions should be needed.
ST Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
38 Annot., 24 A.L.R. 2d 895, 896 (1950).
39 United States v. Hiss, 185 F. 2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950).40 Thus the question basically resolves itself to a matter of degree to be deter-
mined by the appellate court. Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 1443 (1962) has an ex-
haustive discussion citing numerous cases involving factual situations in
which this question has been decided.
19641
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[
"When a witness claims his privilege, a natural, indeed an almost
inevitable, inference arises as to what would have been his answer
if he had not refused. If the prosecution knows when it puts the
question that he will claim the privilege, it is charged with notice
of the probable effect of his refusal upon the jury's mind. ' 1
Considering all the circumstances, the four questions put to Mr.
Kahn by the prosecutor constituted the only evidence which con-
nected Namet with persons actually taking bets. That an inference
was naturally drawn by the jury as to what the answers would have
been is obvious from the questions and from the manner in which
the incident was staged. Therefore, the questions were extremely
prejudicial and should have entitled Namet to a new trial.
Of the three positions taken by the courts in this country, the
Texas rule presents the best reasoning. The Texas court will reverse
when bad faith is found even though a curative instruction is given.
Viewed objectively, an instruction telling the jury to disregard
the witness' refusal to answer does little more than to call their at-
tention to it again. There is an odium in the public mind for the
Fifth Amendment. This odium quite naturally reflects on the de-
fendant when the witness refuses to testify. A curative instruction
will not cleanse the result. To state that it will is naive. Texas, realiz-
ing this, has with pragmatic zeal fostered the most liberal rule in
this area. If the appellate court finds the prejudicial error was suf-
ficiently aggravated, an instruction will not suffice. This should be
the rule throughout the country.
G. Dennis Adams
CONFLICT OF LAWS -GAMBLING CONTRACT, VALID
WHERE MADE, HELD UNENFORCEABLE BY FORUM
PUBLIC POLICY. Intercontinental Hotels Corporation v.
Golden (N.Y. 1963).
Golden borrowed $12,000 from a Puerto Rican hotel to gamble
at the hotel's dice tables. Under Puerto Rican law such gambling is
legal.' Having lost the money, he returned to New York where the
hotel sought recovery. Held: A gambling contract, although valid
where made, was unenforceable in New York because of a constitu-
tional prohibition against gambling that represented a deep-rooted
41 262 F. 2d at 537.
1 LAws, PuERTo Rico, ANN., Trr. 15, ch. 5, § 71-84.
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